Addendum to the Algiers Memorandum on the Effective Implementation of Certain Good Practices Aimed at Preventing Kidnappings by Terrorists

The December 2012 Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists (Algiers Memorandum) recognizes the prevention of kidnappings as one of the keys to countering the broader phenomenon of kidnapping for ransom (KFR) and contains several related good practices, including:

- The provision of up-to-date travel advisories and other information that identifies specific high-risk areas;
- The identification and protection of potential targets of kidnapping;
- Communication with relevant private employers and employees about KFR risks; and
- Promoting public awareness of KFR prosecutions.

The Algiers Memorandum also encourages states to share good practices on developing comprehensive strategies to deny terrorists opportunities for KFR activity. In light of the continuing scourge of KFR, and the commitment of the GCTF members to prevent the further proliferation of KFR, deny terrorists the benefits of this crime, and bring those responsible to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, including human rights law and international humanitarian law, several GCTF members called for the development of specific recommendations to assist States with the effective implementation of the Algiers Memorandum, in particular those Good Practices that are relevant to the prevention of KFR.

To achieve that goal, the Government of Algeria hosted a meeting of KFR experts and practitioners from GCTF members, other interested states, and multilateral organizations to craft a set of specific recommendations to effectively implement the aspects of the Algiers Memorandum aimed at preventing KFR.

In addition to fostering increasingly effective government action to prevent KFR, the experts concluded that recommendations designed to further the efforts of companies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and individuals to help prevent KFR are also necessary. Therefore, the recommendations in Sections II and III below should inform and support government outreach programs under Algiers Memorandum Good Practices 14 and 15.

I. Recommendations Related to Effective Government Actions and Programs

Recommendation 1: Share information and intelligence on kidnapping threats internally, including with embassies and consulates abroad, and with likeminded governments, to work towards a coordinated domestic and international deterrence and response effort, and remain prepared to respond proactively to actionable intelligence. (Algiers Memorandum Good Practices 2, 5, 8, and 11)

Recommendation 2: Publicly announce no-ransom or no-concessions policies so as to inform citizens and prevent and deter hostage-takings.
Recommendation 3: In states where there is a risk of KFR, cultivate strong relationships with local leaders and populations in order to engage them in communal security efforts. Such states should consider accomplishing this through public awareness campaigns, town hall-style meetings, and partnerships with NGOs, which are often well-positioned to identify at-risk individuals, disseminate advisories, conduct capacity-building and training, and establish or advertise public tip lines.

Recommendation 4: Generate timely, balanced, factual, and accurate travel advisories and other information both to identify high-risk areas and to advise citizens accordingly; if resources are constrained, seek instead to provide links to (and/or translations of) travel advisories and other information originally generated by foreign governments or reputable NGOs. Targeted and geographically-specific travel advisories for particular regions of, or border areas within, a country can limit any unintended economic impact on the country under advisory. (Algiers Memorandum Good Practice 1)

Recommendation 5: Conduct proactive public outreach, (e.g., via traditional or social media, public radio, government websites, or cell phone applications, as well as targeted outreach to private individuals and entities) aimed at raising awareness of the risks that hostage-taking and KFR by terrorists pose at specific times or to specific groups. Issue press releases before high travel seasons and work with NGOs, insurance companies, adventure travel companies, tour guides, airlines, hotels, and travel industry associations both to raise awareness of kidnapping threats and to encourage the communication of relevant information to their members and customers. Directly engage specific individuals or groups expressing interest in, or an intent to, travel to high-risk areas, to provide them with information about security threats, previous hostage-takings, and relevant government contacts. To deter travel to high-risk areas, consider working with former hostages to develop short public service videos about the realities of KFR. (Algiers Memorandum Good Practices 1, 15)

Recommendation 6: Offer online registries for private international travelers so that embassies and consulates can account for such travelers and alert them to emerging threats and/or to changes of the governmental travel advisories and develop additional emergency alert systems (e.g., via phone chains, text message lists, e-mail distribution lists, or social media) to warn citizens known to be living, working, or traveling in high-risk environments of relevant special and/or unexpected threats, including from potential hostage-takers. (Algiers Memorandum Good Practices 1, 15)

Recommendation 7: Provide tailored security briefings to government officials on short-term assignment to high-risk areas, and tailored personal security training to government officials on longer-term assignment to such areas. (Algiers Memorandum Good Practices 1, 15)

Recommendation 8: Review on a regular basis, and as necessary in light of evolving threats, the physical and mobile security arrangements in place for foreign mission staff in high-risk areas abroad, including diplomatic missions and official residences. Consider the use of personal and vehicle tracking devices for staff assigned to such areas. (Algiers Memorandum Good Practice 11)

Recommendation 9: Consider increasing the visible presence of local police forces or national security services in high-risk areas so as to prevent and deter kidnappings.
II. Recommendations for Companies and Non-Governmental Organizations

**Recommendation 10:** Prioritize discussions of terrorism, KFR risks, and community outreach within the senior decision-making level of the company or organization, and incorporate all appropriate security procedures and arrangements, as well as corporate social responsibility programs, into profit models.

**Recommendation 11:** Understand applicable national laws, policies, and capabilities, including of the host nation, and educate employees accordingly.

**Recommendation 12:** Develop positive relationships with local communities and leaders, such as by establishing corporate social responsibility programs that “give back” to those communities, both financially and programmatically. Such relationships and programs will contribute to the political and economic stability of the community, generally resulting in an improved security environment for the community, as well as for the company or organization.

**Recommendation 13:** Alert relevant embassies or consulates to the presence of on-site employees who are their nationals and encourage those employees to provide their names, locations, and phone numbers to the nearest relevant embassies or consulates, so that their home governments can account for them and communicate alerts related to continuing or emerging kidnapping threats.

**Recommendation 14:** Establish the ability to maintain accountability of all company employees, including via tracking equipment as feasible and appropriate, and to generate immediate alerts for company security staff when accountability is lost.

**Recommendation 15:** Mitigate the vulnerability of employees by considering the implications of employees’ nationalities when deploying staff to conflict zones or other areas with a high risk of kidnapping, and by providing tailored personal security training, as appropriate, to employees and their family members living or working in high-risk areas.

**Recommendation 16:** For aid organizations with international operations, consider working with trusted local partners to identify safe locations or facilities where food, water, medicine, and other supplies may be transferred to local partners to distribute within active conflict or disaster zones.

**Recommendation 17:** When purchasing the products of freelance journalists or independent consultants, advise them of the risk of being taken hostage and require them to take appropriate steps to mitigate that risk before completing the purchase agreement.

**Recommendation 18:** Review on a regular basis, and as necessary in light of evolving threats, the physical security arrangements in place at vulnerable worksites, in particular fixed worksites such as mines, plants, or factories, and, where relevant, employees’ homes or company-provided housing units. Ensure that all such arrangements, including facility security plans, comply with relevant host nation laws and regulations. Evaluate the necessity and feasibility of building emergency shelters, “panic rooms,” or “safe havens” at high-risk facilities.
**Recommendation 19:** Collaborate with local police and/or national security services, which often maintain a detailed understanding of the local threat environment. Establish the ability to communicate immediately and directly with local law enforcement officials and national security services in the event of an attempted hostage-taking or similar crisis, for example via phone hotlines or panic buttons connected to wireless networks.

### III. Recommendations for Individuals

**Recommendation 20:** Understand that the ability of your home or host government to provide assistance in a kidnapping incident may be severely limited in locations where the government recommends against travel, the security situation is particularly dangerous, or access is limited, and adjust your plans accordingly or refrain from travel to such locations.

**Recommendation 21:** Heed travel advisories or other warnings provided by your home government, host government, company, or organization, and take all possible precautions specified in those advisories and warnings.

**Recommendation 22** Use only licensed or official tour guides or companies, particularly in countries where there may be a known risk of kidnapping in certain regions.

**Recommendation 23:** Where available, notify both your home and host governments, including via relevant embassies or consulates, of the dates and locations of residency, employment, or travel abroad, and register for emergency alerts via phone call, SMS/text message, social media, or e-mail.

**Recommendation 24:** Develop and adhere to a communications plan that requires affirmative contact at pre-determined intervals with designated points of contact, to possibly include government officials, company representatives, or friends and family members.

**Recommendation 25:** Seek out personal security and situational awareness training, including detection and avoidance of threats.