Initiative to Address Homegrown Terrorism

Rabat – Washington Good Practices on the Prevention, Detection, Intervention and Response to Homegrown Terrorism

Introduction

The global community faces the on-going threat of homegrown terrorism, with a number of countries already experiencing these types of attacks. ISIL/Da’esh, Al-Qaida, and their cells, affiliates, splinter groups or derivatives as well as other transnational terrorist groups use their experience to direct, enable, inspire, and/or incite individuals to commit deadly terrorist attacks. In lieu of luring foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), these terrorist groups are encouraging individuals to perpetrate attacks in their own countries, mainly against soft targets and using whatever means they have at hand in order to instill fear and promote polarization within society.

While there is no universal way to prevent these types of attacks or predict an individual’s path to radicalization to violence, this Initiative focused on some commonalities among homegrown terrorists that could warrant some additional discussion and review. In addition, the Initiative examined prevention, detection, intervention, and response strategies and mechanisms in order to develop non-binding good practices that could assist policymakers and practitioners in their work.

In a few recent homegrown terrorism cases, there were reports that families, teachers, and/or social workers noticed signs of radicalization to violence and even reported their suspicions to local authorities but insufficient action was taken to intervene. In other cases, family members opted not to report their suspicions in order to protect at-risk individuals from being subjected to a police investigation.

In addition, in some countries, social service providers, psychologists, local community leaders, and family members may have been excluded from or not integrated sufficiently into national or local level counterterrorism programs. While States play a central role in preventing and countering terrorism, these actors may be closer to an at-risk individual and could contribute to and enhance the effectiveness of prevention and intervention activities.

Another issue that a number of countries grapple with is the difficulty in determining terrorist intentions and identifying tools that can be used by law enforcement to help detect early warning signs of radicalization to violence. For instance, in some of the recent homegrown terrorist attacks, the perpetrators were known to domestic law enforcement agencies before they carried out the attacks. In several of these cases, individuals were interviewed by law enforcement officers but based on the

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1 For this Initiative, the term homegrown terrorism means acts of violence committed by an individual in their country of citizenship or legal residency, who is incited, instructed, supported by and/or otherwise linked to a terrorist organization that operates outside of that country. While these good practices are meant to address this particular circumstance, these good practices could be applicable and relevant to other categories of terrorist offenders, as defined by national legislation and regional recommendations such as the Council of Europe’s Recommendation of Terrorist Acting Alone, 4 April 2018.

2 See generally GCTF Antalya Memorandum on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context.
information they had access to, they deemed the individuals to be low or no terrorism risk. An assessment of the potential threat someone may pose is crucial because it can help law enforcement officers prioritize efforts and use their resources in the most effective manner.

An additional issue related to homegrown terrorism that was discussed during this Initiative was the need to enhance horizontal and vertical information-sharing among competent government agencies within a country. For example, there may be cases where radicalization to violence occurs during incarceration, but critical information regarding prisoners may not be transmitted to the relevant law enforcement agencies once the prisoner is released. In addition, individuals of concern may be known to national or local level agencies but that information may not be shared with other officials or agencies at a different level within the country.

All of these issues may limit governments’ abilities to detect and tackle radicalization to violence that may lead to homegrown terrorism. Therefore, to help countries address this growing phenomenon, Morocco and the United States of America, under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and in partnership with the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), launched the Initiative to Address Homegrown Terrorism, in September 2017. This Initiative brought together government officials, academics, criminal justice practitioners, and non-governmental representatives from over forty countries as well as numerous multilateral and regional organizations to share lessons learned and identify good practices.3

These non-binding good practices are intended to assist policymakers and practitioners as they develop, implement, and evaluate policies and programs to confront the homegrown terrorism phenomenon. This document is intended to be a complementary piece to GCTF The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon (The Hague-Marrakech Memo)4 and

3 The GCTF Initiative to Address Homegrown Terrorism was launched at an event in Malta hosted by the IIJ on 15-16 November 2017. The launch meeting brought together a broad array of actors to help identify the key themes for the Initiative. A second workshop was held in Malta at the IIJ on 31 January and 1 February 2018, focusing on the role of civil society and law enforcement in prevention and intervention activities. A third workshop was held at the IIJ in Malta on 25-26 April 2018 focusing on challenges within the criminal justice system that hinder timely detection of homegrown terrorism. These draft good practices were reviewed and discussed by GCTF Members at a meeting hosted by Morocco in Rabat on 25 June 2018.

4 In addition to the Hague-Marrakech Memo and its Addendum, readers are encouraged to review and incorporate good practices from a range of applicable GCTF documents that address cross-cutting issues that are highlighted in this memorandum. Furthermore, while this document is meant to showcase new good practices as well as reinforce key good practices from other GCTF documents, readers are encouraged to also review the myriad of good practices and recommendations that are critical to addressing the lifecycle of radicalization to violence at https://toolkit.thegctf.org. Potentially helpful documents include the GCTF’s Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector (Rabat Memo) which contains a number of good practices that are relevant for addressing homegrown terrorism such as Good Practice 2, which encourages cooperation and coordination among domestic government agencies that have responsibilities or information relevant to counterterrorism. Other relevant GCTF documents may include but are not limited to the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (Ankara Memo), Recommendations on the Effective Use of Appropriate Alternative Measures for Terrorism Related Offenses, Antalya Memorandum on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context (Antalya Memo), The Role of Families in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Strategic Recommendations and Programming Options, Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community Oriented Policing as a Tools to Counter Violent Extremism, Zurich-London Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online, and Neuchatel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context.
the Addendum to The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum focusing on returning FTFs, in order to ensure a comprehensive response to the current terrorism landscape. All States are encouraged to consider these non-binding good practices, as appropriate, while recognizing that any implementation should be consistent with international norms and standards, as well as national law. In addition, States should take into account the principle of national sovereignty and varied histories, cultures, resources, and legal systems when considering if and how to implement the information highlighted in this document. Any implemented policy, program, or measure that derives from these non-binding good practices should adhere to the rule of law and respect individual’s rights. Also, while this Initiative focused primarily on domestic efforts to address homegrown terrorism, there is still a need to ensure international cooperation and collaboration, by enhancing exchange of information and sharing good practices between or among States on radicalization to violence processes and recruitment methods, since terrorism transcends borders.

A central theme that emerged from this Initiative was the need to take a multi-stakeholder approach in preventing, detecting, intervening, and responding to homegrown terrorists. Since multi-stakeholder approaches have been highlighted and promoted in a significant number of other GCTF good practices, it was not showcased as a separate good practice in this document. However, States may want to consider the number of potential benefits of using multiple and diverse stakeholders in the creation, implementation, and evaluation of programs and policies directed at preventing radicalization to violence and combating homegrown terrorism. For example, while law enforcement officers have the primary responsibility in assessing the danger an individual poses, psychologists, religious leaders, social workers, community service providers, mental health officials and other practitioners may be able to provide expertise and information to law enforcement officers.

**Good Practices**

I. **Understanding the Homegrown Terrorism Phenomenon**

*Good Practice 1: Establish and explore motivations and connections to transnational terrorist organizations.*

While there may be some shared traits among homegrown terrorists, there is not a typical or a single profile of these types of offenders. Their level of connection to transnational terrorist organizations is varied. For example, there may be lone actors who may have no direct or formal affiliation with a transnational terrorist group but may be inspired and/or incited by its ideology either online or via direct human contact. There may be others more closely linked to a transnational terrorist group who are instructed to attack a specific target or aided in some other manner.

Some experts noted that the lack of homegrown terrorists’ motivation to travel to conflict zones could be a sign of a weaker connection to terrorist groups. However, there is insufficient data to substantiate that and other general hypothesis about what distinguishes a homegrown terrorist from a foreign terrorist fighter or what common traits these groups share. Therefore, to better understand the problem and craft effective policies to combat homegrown terrorism, it is important for States to review and understand the potential linkages a homegrown terrorist may have to terrorist groups, as well as recognize the different motivating factors and indicators of radicalization to violence in the context of homegrown terrorism.
Good Practice 2: Examine the potential criminal nexus to homegrown terrorism.

States may want to consider exploring and verifying the potential links between criminal activities, including transnational organized crime, and homegrown terrorism. While there are some reports that indicate individuals with a criminal past are more likely to commit acts of terrorism, more in-depth analysis regarding the connection between criminality and terrorism is warranted. In terms of the connection between homegrown terrorists and transnational criminals, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 recognized the potential link between these two groups and emphasized the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels. In addition to improving collaboration on this topic, States may wish to develop a better understanding of the various dynamics, associations, and motivations linked to transnational terrorist groups and organized criminal networks to identify and dismantle any networks, allocate sufficient resources, and develop effective and targeted programs aimed at combating radicalization to violence that may lead to homegrown terrorism. The need for further examination is warranted because there is little consensus on the topic.

Good Practice 3: Build bridges among policymakers, practitioners, and researchers across a variety of relevant disciplines.7

Efforts could be made to connect researchers from a variety of disciplines with policymakers and practitioners, who are working on preventing and countering terrorism, particularly those focusing on the homegrown terrorism phenomenon. This type of collaboration could ensure that programs and policies are informed and supported by verifiable data and expertise. It could also be helpful if researchers studying homegrown terrorism translated their findings into concrete, actionable programmatic recommendations for practical use by policymakers and practitioners. It may also be beneficial for researchers to be integrated into appropriate programs so that tangible data can be obtained and disseminated. Finally, it could be helpful if researchers used the expertise and data provided by government agencies, as appropriate, to study terrorism patterns and trends.

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5 See generally GCTF The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism. In addition, readers may wish to review UNODC’s Education for Justice (E4J) initiative and its focus on research regarding the linkages between terrorism and organized crime.

6 University of Maryland’s START “Pre-Radicalization Criminal Activity is Strongest Predictor of Post-Radicalization Violent Extremism” (noting that individuals who engaged in non-violent or violent crime prior to radicalizing were 1.85 times more likely to engage in acts of violent extremism after radicalizing than were violent extremists without criminal histories) http://www.start.umd.edu/news/pre-radicalization-criminal-activity-strongest-predictor-post-radicalization-violent-extremism.

7 The European Union Cooperation Mechanism, which will be established in late 2018, and African Union’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSR) may serve as potential examples of research networks focusing on bridging the gap among practitioners, policymakers, civil society organizations, and researchers.
II. Prevention

*Good Practice 4: Educate the public about homegrown terrorism threats.*

Citizens can be invaluable actors in prevention activities. They can notice early warning signs and play an important role in helping to redirect individuals off the path of radicalization to violence. In order to promote active and positive engagement by a range of citizens, including family members, there could be outreach by government agencies and relevant non-governmental organizations to increase the awareness of the potential risks and warning signs of radicalization to violence, which could ultimately lead to an act of homegrown terrorism. An important part of a government’s responsibility in educating the public may be the development and oversight of structures for reporting signs of radicalization to violence coming from local communities. Furthermore, States may wish to provide citizens with information and resources on what to do if they suspect someone is radicalized to violence. As part of the awareness raising process, it is critical that entities, which are conducting these educational and outreach efforts, establish trust within local communities. Having a foundation of trust will help citizens play an active role in dealing with this issue and have confidence that their feedback will result in positive and not punitive outcomes. In this regard, States may consider to involve, where appropriate, religious authorities and local community leaders who have relevant expertise in crafting and delivering effective prevention programs. Also, States should be mindful of the need to provide appropriate support and protection to civil society organizations and other groups or individuals involved in prevention outreach and awareness raising activities.

*Good Practice 5: Incorporate homegrown terrorism prevention activities into broad-based crime prevention programs and approaches.*

States may want to consider including homegrown terrorism issues into broader crime prevention programs and strategies that encourage civil society and law enforcement collaboration to address citizens’ security concerns. There may be lessons learned and synergies between individuals who become homegrown terrorists and those who may be drawn to other types of criminal activities. This approach may help avoid duplication of services, optimize use of resources, and bolster safety and security. Also, by framing programs and services as part of a broader effort to address criminality, it may help to reduce alienation or stigmatization that often accompanies terrorism activities and may increase citizen participation, where appropriate. In addition, the inclusion of anti-terrorism activities as part of a larger anti-crime program may help encourage engagement by different stakeholders including local community members as well as the private sector.

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8 Prevention refers to efforts aimed at keeping individuals from becoming radicalized to violence. Prevention should be regarded as one of the key parts of any strategy to combat terrorism as described in the Pillar I of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. See generally the GCTF Lifecycle of Radicalization Toolkit at [www.toolkit.thegctf.org](http://www.toolkit.thegctf.org) since there are a range of good practices regarding the prevention of radicalization to violence that may be applicable to this particular issue.

9 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2354 reinforces this notion since it states “States’ counterterrorism efforts can benefit from encouraging positive role of civil society to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding, in promoting tolerance and coexistence, and in fostering an environment which is not conducive to radicalization and incitement to terrorism, as well as in countering terrorist narratives.”

10 See generally Antalya Memo (providing insights on partnering with the private sector, including owners and operators of commercial facilities).
**Good Practice 6: Tailor homegrown terrorism prevention programs to local community needs and issues.**

Prevention programs that are tailored to the specific characteristics of the local communities are more likely to resonate with members of that group than national or regional anti-terrorism campaigns. Locally developed and implemented programs that are aimed at preventing individuals from becoming potential homegrown terrorists need to be predictable, systematic, and strategic in order to develop the local community’s trust and promote meaningful inclusion. These efforts need to also respect human rights and promote the rule of law. Policies and programs developed without an understanding of local conditions will be both less effective and potentially erode trust.

**Good Practice 7: Involve those who are best-placed to affect change, including youth, women, and “formers,” in the development and implementation of prevention activities.**

As emphasized in the GCTF *The-Hague Marrakech Memo,* it is important to consider including relevant non-government actors, including those who may be most susceptible to being targeted for recruitment and those with most influence on these at risk individuals, in the design and delivery of prevention programs. This is particularly true for programs geared towards youth since there is some data that shows efforts developed by young people for their peers seemed to have more of an impact and produce tangible results. In some cases, States may consider incorporating disengaged, de-radicalized and reintegrated terrorists in prevention activities, when it is possible to prove that they are really reformed and there could be sufficient supervision. These individuals may be able to speak authoritatively about the perils of being a terrorist and there have been some demonstrative results from these types of programs that may be informative to States looking to develop similar efforts.

**Good Practice 8: Predicate prevention programs on trust and ensure that there is cooperation and shared responsibility between government authorities and local communities.**

Trust is a vital element for any prevention program to be effective and successful. It is important for government agencies, such as law enforcement agencies, to establish trust with local community members by engaging with them on a broad range of issues, addressing critical safety and security needs, and incorporating sociological-sensitive specialists, such as mental health practitioners and social-service providers, in local programs. Also, it is critical for States to make sure that any programs and/or policies it supports do not stigmatize or alienate any specific religious, racial, or cultural group. Overall, States and civil society actors may seek to form public-private partnerships in preventing and countering terrorism.

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11 *The-Hague Marrakech Memo* Good Practice 4 emphasizing the need to empower those who are best-placed to affect change, including youth, families, women, and civil society, to take ownership in the development and messaging of positive counter-narratives to the violent extremist agenda.

12 See generally GCTF *Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders.*

13 GCTF *Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as tools to Counter Violent Extremism* Good Practice 2 stating [t]rust is an integral part of community engagement and community-oriented policing, but one that does not occur naturally and without concerted and sustained efforts.
III. Detection

**Good Practice 9: Provide training on indicators of radicalization to violence that may lead to homegrown terrorism for front-line actors such as law enforcement officers, prison officials, social workers and mental health officials.**

Oftentimes, the individuals who may be the first to come in contact with a potential homegrown terrorist may not know the warning signs of radicalization to violence. Therefore, States may wish to educate key interlocutors on potential warning signs of radicalization to violence and provide information on what to do if they suspect someone is radicalized and could pose a threat to society. Specifically, States may want to ensure that any law enforcement and prison officials who do not typically deal with terrorists, receive training on detecting and identifying signs of homegrown terrorism. Similarly, stakeholders outside of the criminal justice system such as mental health official, social workers, religious leaders, and family members may benefit from awareness training so that they can detect warning signs of radicalization to violence and intervene appropriately and responsibly before an individual is fully radicalized to violence and commits a terrorist attack. It is important for States to be mindful of any potential unintended consequences of any awareness raising efforts that could stigmatize, profile, or alienate any particular group within society. In order to amplify this information, States may wish to develop some online materials and trainings to help raise awareness and educate front-line actors.

**Good Practice 10: Develop mechanisms to disseminate information about potential and suspected homegrown terrorists broadly within domestic government agencies.**

As highlighted in the GCTF’s *Hague-Marrakech Memo*, States are encouraged to collect, analyze, and share detailed information about potentially high-risk individuals. It may be particularly useful for States to develop vertical mechanisms to gather and share critical information between local and national level agencies. In addition, there should be horizontal information sharing mechanisms and protocols so that information may be shared among different agencies. There are a number of different ways, including formal and informal methods that a State may wish to implement its procedures to share information among different domestic agencies. For example, a taskforce or a coordination/fusion center can be a critical conduit for collecting, analyzing, and sharing valuable information needed to detect, interdict,

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14 A June 2017 study by the George Washington University’s Program on Extremism found that 57% of the individuals involved in European and North American terrorist attacks had a prior criminal history.

15 *Rabat Memo* Good Practice 2 encouraging cooperation and coordination among domestic government agencies and notes effective investigation of terrorist threats often involves the gathering and analysis of information collected by multiple agencies within a single government, such as intelligence, law enforcement, military, finance and banking agencies, as well as provincial, state, or local governments. Also, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 calls upon “Member States to improve domestic information sharing within their respective criminal justice systems in order to more effectively monitor returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and other individuals radicalized to violence or directed by ISIL or other terrorist groups to commit terrorist acts, in accordance with international law.” *Antalya Memo* Good Practice 1 notes that information need not be sensitive or classified to be valuable. Terrorists often identify targets and offer operational instructions through their online, publicly available publications. This publicly available information can be analyzed to assess enemy capabilities and intentions, particularly when they advertise so openly about techniques and tactics they consider successful (or not) and what they exhort their followers to use.

16 *Hague Marrakech Memo* Good Practice 7 promoting the collection and fusing detailed information from government agencies, front line workers, communities, and social media to detect recruitment and facilitation while respecting the rule of law and human rights.
investigate, and prosecute suspected homegrown terrorists. Plus, it is a mechanism for bringing together local and national criminal justice practitioners and for dismantling stovepipes among different agencies that have a role in detecting homegrown terrorists. In addition, States may opt to use agreements or other arrangements that will allow agencies to share information.

Additionally, States may want to review and update their legal frameworks, where appropriate and necessary, to ensure that there is the proper legal authority to disseminate information among different agencies as well as regulations or protocols to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and protection of the information. Moreover, States may seek to examine their classification policies to ensure that only appropriate information is deemed classified.

**Good Practice 11: Conduct specialized risk assessments** of at risk individuals at an early stage and use a joint platform to conduct the assessment.

States could consider mechanisms, as appropriate and that do not compromise the integrity of a criminal investigation, which brings together a multidisciplinary group of professionals including government officials, law enforcement officers, local community service providers, mental health experts, and other medical practitioners to use specialized risk assessment tools as early as possible. Currently, most specialized risk assessment tools are used in a prison setting once an individual has been convicted. However, they could be used during earlier stages in the criminal justice process to support proactive investigations that are geared towards detecting and thwarting terrorist attacks. Because of classified nature of terrorism investigations in some jurisdictions, States may not be able to share specific to outside professionals; however, States could consider including experts on staff who could assist law enforcement in making risk assessments.

These specialized assessment tools should have specific factors, variables, and indicators related to terrorism that are important to consider when evaluating an individual, such as age, gender, mental health, and other relevant identity markers. Furthermore, these types of mechanisms require a solid methodology, clearly defined guidelines, and relevant training in order to conduct realistic assessments. It is important that any type of risk assessment conducted is based on professional judgment and should be part of a larger and continuous effort to evaluate a person’s risk for becoming a homegrown terrorist. States may wish to share their experiences using these types of specialized risk assessment tools and contribute to the overall development and refinement of these types of instruments.

**Good Practice 12: Engage non-governmental and private sectors in identifying at-risk individuals and indicators.**

States may wish to involve diverse actors from the non-profit and private sectors when trying to detect individuals who are at risk for becoming homegrown terrorists. For instance, private sector employees and owners may bring a unique perspective in identifying suspicious behavior. Also, non-governmental

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17 Examples of specialized risk assessment tools include the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA 2R+), Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+), and the Terrorism Risk Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18).

18 Hague Marrakech Memo Good Practice 16 endorsing the use of evidence-based, individual level assessment frameworks to establish appropriate responses.

19 Antalya Memo Good Practice 9 highlighting the importance of citizen outreach to promote awareness of one’s surroundings and encourage reporting of suspicious activities and anomalies. In addition to local community members, for example, private sector staff can contribute to security by reporting suspicious activity.
organizations may have more established, trusted relationships with local community members than law enforcement or government agencies and therefore may be able to provide insights that can assist with detection efforts. However, it is important that non-governmental actors are not put in a position whereby they would jeopardize or erode the trust that they have garnered within the local community.

**Good Practice 13: Strengthen outreach and engagement with a broad range of online technology companies.**

Recognizing that States have the primary responsibility in preventing and countering terrorism and it is within each country’s prerogative to decide how to engage with companies on the issue of terrorists’ use of the Internet, States may want to broaden their outreach to include smaller, less publicized online, encrypted platforms as a way to detect online terrorist recruitment and disrupt terrorism financing. While States should continue to work with well-known and larger technology and social media companies to combat online recruitment, it may be beneficial to start to engage, as appropriate, with smaller companies that operate lesser known online platforms that are being used by transnational terrorist groups to recruit and radicalize individuals.\(^\text{20}\) These partners from the tech industry may provide valuable insights of the use of information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet and other media, with the purpose of committing, fomenting, recruiting for, financing or planning terrorist attacks.

**IV. Intervention\(^\text{21}\)**

**Good Practice 14: Ensure that there are comprehensive legal and policy frameworks to allow for tailored interventions.**

States may want to review and revise their domestic legal frameworks, as appropriate, to ensure that tailored interventions, such as referral mechanisms and off-ramp programs for at risk individuals, may be developed and implemented.\(^\text{22}\) Overall, States may want to seek to have different legal options\(^\text{23}\) available to deal with individuals who are exhibiting signs of radicalization to violence, depending on the nature of the threat posed by the individual and account for the individual’s age, criminal history and other relevant identity markers.

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\(^{20}\) See generally Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) and its work with smaller tech companies to share best practices on how to disrupt the spread of violent extremist material. See also Tech Against Terrorism, which was initiated by United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, which offers a venue for States to engage with tech companies www.techagainstterrorism.org and Zurich-London Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online.

\(^{21}\) Intervention refers to efforts aimed at individuals who are demonstrating some signs of radicalization to violence yet have not committed a terrorist act. The goal of intervention is to provide an individual with a range of support services that may address some of the issues that may have propelled this person to become attracted to violent ideology. See generally the GCTF Lifecycle to Address Radicalization to Violence Toolkit www.toolkit.thegctf.org.

\(^{22}\) Based on domestic legislation, national context, and the specificities of the country, intervention as well as rehabilitation and reintegration programs should not contradict with effective prosecution as prescribed in national law and the principle of the unavoidability of punishment for terrorist offense as required by some countries’ criminal code.

\(^{23}\) Legal options in this context refers to use of alternative measures such as diversion, deferred prosecution, etc. Readers are encouraged to review the GCTF Recommendations on the Effective Use of Appropriate Alternative Measures for Terrorism-Related Offenses for more on this topic.
Good Practice 15: Establish information-sharing protocols and ensure coordination mechanisms for intervention programs.

For intervention programs to be effective, they must be based on a comprehensive assessment of an at-risk individual. Many agencies and people may have information on such an individual that should be reviewed and included in any intervention strategy for an at-risk individual. Information, such as medical records, must be protected to ensure privacy; so, protocols may need to be developed in order to safeguard personal data.

Good Practice 16: Consider using administrative measures in the context of potential homegrown terrorists, while respecting human rights.24

Appropriate administrative measures, as defined by national legislation, may be a valuable tool for dealing with an individual who is deemed to be a risk but there is no usable evidence that a crime has been committed. These types of measures provide for some type of government oversight and monitoring as a way to limit opportunities for the individual to commit an attack. If administrative measures are used, safeguards are needed to guarantee an individual’s rights and liberties are respected and protected.

V. Response25

Good Practice 17: Disseminate information after a homegrown terrorism attack quickly and accurately.26

Law enforcement agencies should seek to disseminate accurate information to the public as soon as they can after an attack without compromising any ongoing investigation. Additionally, it is important to issue a unified response and message that represents all of the domestic agencies that are involved in responding to an attack by a homegrown terrorist. The media, including social media, can serve as a valuable resource to law enforcement to get verifiable information out to the public. Law enforcement may want to use a range of communication tools to disseminate and receive information. States may want to consider conducting regular background briefings on terrorism related topics to different media outlets. This proactive outreach may be useful in developing relationships with media organizations so that they can accurately report on transnational terrorist organizations and the threats they pose.

Good Practice 18: Avoid stigmatization of any particular community after a homegrown terrorist attack.

States should be cognizant of post-event messaging to avoid glorifying an offender and stigmatizing a group or community that is associated with the offender, including family members. It may also be useful for States to craft communications strategies, talking points, and guidelines concerning transnational

24 Administrative measures typically refer to actions that are taken by government agencies. However, in some jurisdictions, a judge may issue an order that limits or prohibits an activity and it is considered an administrative measure. See GCTF Hague Marrakech Memo Good Practice 11 on the development and implementation of appropriate legal regimes and administrative measures to mitigate the risk posed by FTFs.

25 This section is focused on how States engage with media outlets after an attack committed by a homegrown terrorist as well as how States provide support to terrorism victims and witnesses.

26 See generally Antalya Memo Good Practice 13 for recommendations regarding communications before, during, and after an attack. See also UNESCO Terrorism and the Media Handbook http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002470/247074E.pdf.
terrorists groups, which may be helpful to avoid stigmatization and polarization. In addition, States may wish to sponsor targeted outreach campaigns with impacted communities or sponsor public meetings to discuss the attack and its impact.

**Good Practice 19: Support programs aimed at supporting victims of terrorism and protecting witnesses.**

States may wish to consider providing a range of adequate assistance and support services to the impacted local community after a homegrown terrorist attack. Specifically, States may want to ensure that there is infrastructure in place that allows for appropriate coordination among relevant bodies to provide necessary protection to witnesses to an attack and assistance to victims with the social, economic, and psychological support they need to heal from an attack, including those who have been harmed by witnessing the attack.

**Conclusion**

The non-binding, good practices outlined in this document are intended to inform and guide States as they develop and implement programs and policies designed to address homegrown terrorism. The overarching objectives of these good practices are to have States identify challenges and develop effective responses to this phenomenon. The GCTF may serve as a useful forum for continuing the dialogue among States regarding the implementation of these and other relevant GCTF good practices in an effective and responsive manner. In addition to implementing new programs and procedures to address homegrown terrorism, States are encouraged to continue to conduct research on this topic as well as evaluate and refine their efforts. While some of the approaches identified in the good practices have been used in a different context, they may be untested in their applicability to this particular problem set. Therefore, research as well as monitoring and evaluation are critical to developing data that can help ensure efforts are effective.

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See generally Madrid Memorandum on Good Practices for Assistance to Victims of Terrorism Immediately after the Attack and in Criminal Proceedings and Rabat Memo Good Practice 1 Protect Victims, Witnesses, Informants, Undercover Agents, Juries, Investigators, Prosecutors, Defense Counsel, and Judges in Counterterrorism Cases.